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SEX AND THE SINGLE MAN: DISCRIMINATION IN THE
DEPENDENT CARE DEDUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Charles E. Moritz, a single never-married man, maintained a home
for himself and his elderly mother who was unable to care for herself.
In order to fulfill his employment responsibilities which involved travel,
Moritz employed a woman to care for his mother and perform household
duties. He paid the woman $1250 in 1968 and deducted $600 for
"household help for invalid mother" on his individual income tax return
for that year. This was the maximum deduction for dependent care
expenses under section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.'
Section 214 provides:
(a) There shall be allowed as a deduction expenses paid
during the taxable year by a taxpayer who is a woman or
widower, or is a husband whose wife is incapacitated or is
institutionalized, for the care of one or more dependents (as
defined in subsection (d)(1)), but only if such care is for
the purpose of enabling the taxpayer to be gainfully employed.
(d) (1) . . . The term "dependent" means a person with
respect to whom the taxpayer is entitled to an exemption under
section 151 (e) (1)-
(A) who has not attained the age of 13 years
and who (within the meaning of section 152) is a son,
stepson, daughter, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer; or
(B) who is physically or mentally incapable of
caring for himself.
(2) . . . The term "widower" includes an unmarried
individual who is legally separated from his spouse under a
decree of divorce or of separate maintenance.2
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the $600 deduction and a
deficiency notice against the taxpayer was asserted in the amount of
$328.80 for taxes due and owing in 1968. The taxpayer petitioned the
Tax Court for a redetermination of this deficiency; however, the court
ruled in favor ofithe Government.'
The Tax Court supported this decision with two arguments. The
1. All statutory references in the text are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 214(a), (d).
3. Charles E. Moritz, 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970).
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first was that Moritz, as a single never-married man, was not entitled
to the deduction either by congressional intent or under the clearly
written terms of the statute. The second argument was that exclusion
of Moritz from the statute's provisions was not a denial of his right
to due process under the fifth amendment. Despite these arguments, the
court concluded that Moritz's "remedy lies with Congress, and not in
this Court."4 This statement suggests that, although the court denied
judicial relief to Moritz, his grievance was not without validity.
One legislative remedy which might be advanced is the enactment
of a constitutional amendment forbidding the denial of equal rights on
the basis of sex. The proponents of this measure would suggest that
Moritz's grievance is the result of sexual discrimination.5 If an equal
rights amendment were enacted, single male taxpayers necessarily would
become entitled to the benefit of the section 214 deduction.' It will be
illustrated, however, that achieving an equitable solution to Moritz's
problem cannot be accomplished simply in terms of an equal rights
amendment." As Professor Paul Freund has pointed out, "[tihe basic
fallacy of the proposed [equal rights] amendment is that it attempts to
deal with complicated and highly concrete problems arising out of a
diversity of human relationships in terms of a single and simple
abstraction."' Analysis of Moritz's problem indicates that tax law may
be an area in which Freund's criticism is especially relevant.
The problem posed by the court's arguments in Moritz concerns
the equity of section 214. At the outset, it is submitted that section 214,
as an isolated provision, is clearly discriminatory. This effect, however,
neither was caused by nor results in discrimination purely on the basis of
sex. One cannot readily conclude that a discriminatory provision such
as section 214 necessarily violates constitutional due process. Further-
more, at the present time, judicial concern that tax legislation embody
substantive due process is subordinate to the legislative concern that tax
legislation be equitable. These legislative and judicial concerns are
closely interrelated. Because of this interrelationship, achieving tax equity
and insuring due process may come only from viewing an individual
problem in the perspective of the tax system of which it is a part. While
4. Id.
5. Wallach, Comparative Legal Status of American and Soviet Women, 5 VAL.
U.L. REv. 439 (1971).
6. Eastwood, The Double Standard of Justice: Women's Rights Under the Consti-
tution, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 281 (1971).
7. Cf. Freeman, The Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System, 5 VAL. U.L Riv. 203(1971).
8. 96 CONG. REc. 866 (1950). See also Mink, Federal Legislation to End Discrim-
ination Against Women, 5 VA.. U.L REV. 397 (1971).
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the immediate problem must be recognized, a satisfactory solution can
result only from dealing with the problem less in response to its specific
identity and more in regard to the consequences of the proposed solution
upon the system as a whole.
ACHIEVING TAX EQUITY: THE LEGISLATIVE CONCERN
The Tax Court's first argument supporting the decision to deny
Charles E. Moritz a dependent care deduction was that the statute, while
allowing a deduction to women and widowers, clearly excludes single
never-married men. This statutory formulation, according to the court, is
in direct accord with Congress' purpose for the provision. The court
concluded that Moritz could "only avail himself of the deduction if he
. .. [fit] within the terms of the statute, since deductions are solely
matters of legislative grace. '
The statement that "deductions are solely matters of legislative
grace" was a convenient justification of the court's interpretation of the
statute. The merit of using this judicial rule to deny Moritz's claim,
however, is questionable, especially in light of the congressional goals
which are manifested in federal income tax legislation."0
Congressional Goals and Related Problems
Two basic principles of equity underlie individual income tax legis-
lation. The first, which has given rise to the progressive features of our
tax law, is that taxes should be levied in proportion to a taxpayer's
ability to pay." The second is that "equal amounts of income should
bear equal tax liabilities."' The initial problem presented by the second
principle, which bears more directly than the first upon provisions such
as section 214, is to establish a statutory concept of taxable income.
It has been pointed out that
[c]onsistency of the legislatively defined tax base with a
stated, measurable concept of income is the ultimately reliable
test for adherence to the principle of equity in personal taxation.
The "equal treatment of equals" means that individuals similarly
9. 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970).
10. The question of whether any federal legislation can be properly construed as a
manifestation of "congressional goals" or "congressional intent" is not considered here.
11. STAFF OF CONGRESSIONAL JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 84 (Joint Comm.
Print 1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY].
12. STAFF OF THE CONGRESSIONAL JOINT ECONOMIC COM-%., 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
THE FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEM: FACTS AND PROBLEMS 1961, at 14 (Joint Comm. Print
1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 FED. REVENt;E STUDY].
1971]
et al.: Sex and the Single Man: Discrimination in the Dependent Care Dedu
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
circumstanced with respect to income pay the same tax bill. In
a complex modern economy individuals diffei in a multitude
of ways, some relevant and some not. Whether or not two
individuals should be considered similarly circumstanced can
only be determined by defining an independent measure of
income against which each separate circumstance can be
tested.1"
Congress has elected to define that independent measure of gross
income indirectly.1" Under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
certain kinds of receipts are specifically included in a taxpayer's gross
income,15 but income is not limited only to the named receipts."0 Other
provisions specifically exclude some types of receipts from gross income,"'
yet "certain types of income, particularly certain types of income in kind,
while not explicitly excluded from gross income, have never been con-
strued in practice as included in this concept.""9 Among the "income in
kind" referred to is the economic benefit derived by a taxpaying unit
from services both produced and consumed within the unit. For example,
a taxpayer who washes and irons his own workshirts is gaining a
personal benefit from his own productive labor. This benefit, called
"imputed income," is not given a monetary value nor is it declared as
income for tax purposes. 19
After defining gross income, the Internal Revenue Code provides
two major types of adjustments to determine a taxpayer's taxable
income. 0 The first type of adjustment is based upon the recognition
that some taxpayers must incur expense in order to produce income. For
example, the corner grocer must purchase his stock at wholesale in order
to sell it at retail. If his gross sales rather than his net profit were taxed,
he would be discriminated against in favor of taxpayers who do not have
such expenses. Trade and business expenses of this kind, therefore, are
deducted from gross income .before tax liability is computed. Secondly,
13. 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY 354.
14. The term "indirectly" is used to describe the process because the Internal
Revenue Code specifies that "income" is not certain things and is certain other things
but is not limited to what has been so specified.
The discussion which follows is based generally on 1961 FED. REVENUE STUDY 1-5,
14-15.
15. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 71-81.
16. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61(a)
17. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 101-23.
18. 1961 FED. REVENUE STUDY 3.
19. For a discussion of the imputed income problem in relation to proposed expan-
sion of section 214 to include expenses incurred by a working wife for household help,
see notes 133-38 infra and accompanying text.
20. 1961 FED. REVENUE STUDY 1.
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Congress has chosen to provide special treatment for certain kinds of
nontrade or nonbusiness expenses. "In some cases, the occasion for the
special treatment has been the encouragement of certain types of socially
desirable activity [for example, the deduction for charitable contribu-
tions21 ] ; in others, the special treatment was intended to provide
highly selective tax relief [for example, the dependent care deduc-
tion]."" Many of the adjustments in this category are deductions for
what are essentially personal expenditures. 3 Such provisions are excep-
tions to the rule of section 262 of the Internal Revenue Code which
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided . . . no deduction
shall be allowed for personal, living or family expenses." This general
policy is based upon recognition that the Government would receive
little tax revenue if taxpayers were allowed to deduct their living ex-
penses from income before computing tax liability.' Because of this
policy, the wording of most provisions allowing deduction of personal
expenses stands in marked contrast to the flexibility of section 162
which provides for deduction of "all . . . ordinary and necessary business
expenses."25 The latter provision allows wide latitude for administrative
interpretation.2" Deductions for personal expenses, on the other hand,
are normally confined to the explicit terms of the statutory provision.
just as the Tax Court ruled in the Moritz case.2
Problems Arising from the Income Definition Process
The process by which taxable income is defined has been subject to
severe criticism. One charge has been that the system, rather than nro-
ducing equal treatment of equals, creates nonuniform tax burdens.
[I]t is contended that there has been a continuing loss of
uniformity in the income tax base as differential provisions
have been proliferated throughout the law, either by specific
exclusions, deduction, or other qualification, or by failure to
specify inclusion of various types of income.
21. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170.
22. 1961 FED. REVENUE STUDY 1.
23. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 165(d) (gambling losses), § 163 (interest
on certain indebtedness), § 213 (certain medical expenses).
24. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM 376 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
25. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162.
26. "Probably no other statutory allowance has been such a fertile source of litiga-
tion as the business expense allowance has been and still continues to be." 4A J. MERTENS.
THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.01 (1966).
27. 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970).
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This multiplicity of differential tax provisions, it is argued,
is the result of a continuing process of attempting to provide
tax adjustments for special types of situations. The basic dif-
ficulty, it is pointed out, is in the fact that forsaking uniformity
in any one case gives rise to demands for similar concessions in
others . . . . The result is a highly nonuniform income-tax
system which places a premium upon tax-avoidance devices
and increases the relative tax burden on those taxpayers who
are unable to take advantage of the special provisions.28
Tax critics not only fault the income definition process for its
nonuniformity but also claim that the process results in high effective
rates of tax.29 High overall rates, in turn, add to the cycle.
The history of our income tax statute shows a tendency to
enact new personal deductions to alleviate the effect of high
rates on selected taxpayers. Such enactments erode the tax base
and cause the rates on the remaining taxable income to rise
even higher. Each increase in rates brings new demands for
added deductions. 30
The legislative response to charges of inequity and discrimination
in tax law has been to attempt to remedy the problem with special tax
relief."
Many of the special provisions owe their existence to the
discrimination argument. Perhaps the principal point made
before Congress is that, since one group in our society has
received a benefit, the complainant deserves like treatment. The
more preferential the legislation written into the code, the
greater the opportunity for others to claim they are being dis-
criminated against. The difficulty lies in finding, first, some
logical basis for drawing a line, and second, some political
groups supporting the policy of drawing it. 2
These criticisms are all founded in the view that the multiplicity
of special provisions allows the taxpaying public to believe that the
system provides preferred treatment to special classes at the expense
28. 1961 FED. REVENUE STUDY 14-15. See generally COMPENDIUM 251-75, 297-311.
29. COMPENDIUM 440.
30. Id.
31. 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY, supra note 11, at 273.
32. Id.
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of achieving tax equity for all taxpayers. 3 The special provisions like
section 214 which comprise the income definition process are subject to
this general criticism. It has been suggested that if many provisions
allowing deductions to special classes were eliminated, a general rate
reduction could be accomplished with no revenue loss." Others suggest
that the personal exemption allowances be increased and special deduc-
tions be limited." A more extreme suggestion is that the concept of the
taxpaying unit be revised in order to promote tax equity.86
Whether any tax reform measure could operate as a panacea to
eliminate most taxpayer dissatisfaction cannot be determined here. Men-
tioning these criticisms and alternative approaches, however, is relevant
to the immediate question because it should be kept in mind that section
214 is part of only one of many possible approaches to achieving tax
equity. If it became clear beyond theoretical debate that the existing tax
system was inequitable, there would be alternative solutions available for
legislative consideration. The continued existence of these viable alter-
natives should be encouraged."'
A Legislative Analysis of Section 214
Section 214, the dependent care deduction, is an example of one of
the special provisions which comprise the income definition process.
The Tax Court stated in Morita that "[t]he legislative history [of
section 214] shows that Congress gave serious consideration before
... [its] enactment .. .to various points of view. Its action cannot be
said to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." 8 It is submitted,
however, that thorough examination of that legislative history unearths
no reasonable justification for exclusion of single never-married men
from the benefit of section 214.
A deduction for dependent care expenditures was enacted into law
for the first time in 1954 as part of the massive revision of tax law
codified as the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The process by which
this deduction became part of the law followed the general pattern of
development of special provisions discussed previously. 9
33. See generally 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY 251-311; Surrey, The Congress and
the Tax Lobbyist, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1957).
34. See generally COMPENDIUM 3i7-472.
35. Id. at 493-538.
36. See generally id. at 531-38; Note, Tax Treatment of the Family: The Canadian
Royal Commission on Taxation and the Internal Revenue Code, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 98
(1968), in READINGS IN FEDERAL TAXATION 396 (F. Sander & D. Westfall ed. 1970).
37. See note 126 infra and accompanying text.
38. 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970).
39. See p. 419 supra.
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Prior to 1954, expenditures for dependent care were classified as
personal expenses and were not deductible."0 Congress recognized, how-
ever, that expenses incurred to provide care for dependents in order that
the taxpayer could work in some cases were very similar to business
expenses.41 It was argued that these taxpayers were discriminated against
in relation to taxpayers who could take deductions for such things as
expenses incurred to entertain business clients under the umbrella of the
"ordinary and necessary business expense."' 2 In response to this charge,
the House Ways and Means Committee recommended a limited deduc-
tion for child care expenses.' This provision, approved by the full
House, was substantially liberalized when the House bill reached the
Senate Finance Committee." The full Senate approved the amended
version of the deduction which not only allowed more taxpayers to take
advantage of the measure but also expanded the scope of the dedurtion
to include expenses incurred for the care of any dependent unable to
care for himself as well as for expenses for the care of young children. 5
The expanded Senate version was retained in the joint committee com-
promise on the measure"6 and became enacted into law as section 214.
With agreement that equity demanded that a deduction be allowed
for certain dependent care expenses, Congress' major goal was to design
a provision which would confine the deduction to the dependent care
40. 100 CONG. REC. 3441 (1954) (extension of remarks of Congressman Jenkins)
see note 111 infra and accompanying text.
41. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reported in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4017, 4055 (1954) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1337].
42. 100 CONG. REC. 3451 (1954) (remarks of Congressman Forand) ; Hearings on
H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1059, 1062 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as 1954 Hearings] ; cf. 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY, supra note 11,
at 87.
43. H.R. REP. No. 1337, at 4055. In order to provide clarification for the action
taken by the House and Senate on the dependent care deduction, a brief summary follows
of the route taken by the entire tax revision measure as it passed through Congress.
The Constitution requires that revenue bills be initiated by the House of Representatives.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Since bills are discussed in the appropriate congressional com-
mittee before being reported for floor debate, the tax measure was intiated by the House
Ways and Means Committee. H.R. REP. No. 1337, at 4055. The tax bill produced by
that Committee was passed by the House. 100 CONG. REc. 3564 (1954). The House bill
then went to the Senate Finance Committee, which held its own public hearings on the
measure. 1954 Hearings, supra note 42. The Senate Committee recommended an
amended version of the House bill, which was passed by the full Senate after some minor
changes. 100 CONG. REC. 9619 (1954). For full text of Senate amendments see S. RE.P.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Ses. (1954). Both House and Senate versions of the bill were
then forwarded to a joint committee. 100 CONG. REc. D630-31 (Daily Digest 1954). The
compromise version of the bill which emerged was passed subsequently by both House
and Senate and was enacted into law. Id. at D653, D655.
44. S. REP. No. 1622. 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954).
45. Id.
46. 100 CONG. REc. D630 (Daily Digest 1954).
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expenditures most like "business" expenses."" Distinguishing in the
technical sense required by tax law between dependent care expendi-
tures made for "personal" reasons and those which were more "business-
like" might be done on the following basis."' Providing care for another
person is a productive activity requiring the expenditure of time and
energy. If an individual has a responsibility to provide such care, hiring
a substitute to provide that care in one's stead could be motivated by two
kinds of reasons. The first is to obtain time and energy to expend on
another kind of productive activity; the second is to obtain leisure time.
The expense of hiring a substitute is most like a business expense only
when that expense is incurred to obtain time and energy to direct towards
earning a livelihood. If one enters a productive activity for non-economic
reasons or opts for expanded leisure time, then expenditures for sub-
stitute care are more like a freely chosen personal expense than a
necessary business expense. A similar analysis will be used to explain the
limitations which Congress incorporated in section 214 to confine the
deduction to "business-type" expenditures.
A few other goals for the provision have been mentioned either
during the original congressional consideration of the measure or in
later analysis of the provision. 9 The first of these subsidiary goals
was administrative: to limit the measure to prevent excessive loss of
revenue.5" The remaining goals relate to social policy: to provide a
hardship subsidy to certain taxpayers5 and to encourage citizens to care
for their children properly."
47. In the 83d Congress the Republicans were the majority party for the first time
since the early 1930's (with the exception of a two-year interlude in 1947-49 with the
80th Congress). Perhaps the most frequent type of criticism of the tax revision pro-
posal made by the Democratic minority was a variation on the traditional party slogan
that the Republicans were giving preferred treatment to higher income groups at the ex-
pense of the working man. See, e.g., 100 CONG. REc. 9154 (1954) (remarks of Senator
Douglas). Floor debate on the proposal indicates that the Republican members were
particularly concerned with trying to allay that charge. The limitations placed on sec-
tion 214 could be considered as an effort to exhibit the desire of the Republican majority
to benefit needy taxpayers who had been ignored during twenty years of Democratic
power. See, e.g., 100 CONG. REc. 3452 (1954) (remarks of Congressman Curtis).
48. See note 110 infra and accompanying text.
49. The goal of achieving tax equity to solve an imputed income problem, suggested
by some amlysts, will not be discussed at this point. See notes 133-38 infra and accom-
panying text.
50. 1954 Hearings 117; COMPENDIUM 10. The original House measure would have
reduced revenues by $40 million. H.R. REP. No. 1337, at 4055. The expansion of the
proposal by the Senate more than tripled the estimated cost to $130 million. S. REP. No.
1622, supra note 44, at 36.
51. COMPENDIUM 372.
52. 100 CONG. REc. 3422 (1954) (remarks of Congressman Reed, Chairman of
House Ways & Means Comm., introducing the tax measure on House floor).
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LIMITING THE DEPENDENT CARE DEDUCTION
Congress enacted five fundamental limitations" in the original
1954 version of section 214 to confine the deduction in order that the
major goals mentioned above could be achieved and congressional op-
position be minimized. These limitations are in the following terms:
1) the purpose for which the expenditures are made; 2) characteristics
of the persons for whose care expenditures are made; 3) the total amount
which can be deducted; 4) the income of the family in the case of married
couples; and 5) characteristics of taxpayrs entitled to claim the
deduction. 4
The First Limitation: The Taxcpayer's Motive
Congress limited the deduction in terms of the purpose for which
deductible expenditures are made by providing that "[t]here shall be
allowed as a deduction expenses paid . . . for the care of one or more
dependents . . .but only if such care is for the purpose of enabling the
taxpayer to be gainfully employed." 55 This limitation clearly eliminated
the chance that the deduction would be used by taxpayers who employed
substitute care in order to gain leisure time or to participate in an
activity which is not income-producing. It has been pointed out, however,
that "[n]either the Code nor the [Treasury Department] Regulations
[enacted in furtherance of the statute] say or even suggest that economic
necessity must force the taxpayer to work."5 Consequently, although the
provision does guarantee that expenses deducted are incurred for the
production of income, like "business" expenses, the terms of the limita-
tion do not confine the deduction successfully to purely a hardship
subsidy for needy taxpayers.
The Second Limitation: For Whom is Care Provided.
The section 214 deduction frequently has been called the "child-
care provision, '"" but the scope of the deduction is not limited only to
children. The original House proposal would have provided a deduction
for expenses incurred for the care of a child under the age of ten, or
53. The provision contains other limitations which are not discussed here, e.g., ex-
penses must have been incurred during the taxable year and paid to someone not a de-
pendent of the taxpayer.
54. It was the terms of this fifth limitation which Moritz contended were arbi-
trary, capricious and unreasonable.
55. IN?. REv. CODE of 1954, § 214.
56. How to Get the Maximum Deduction for the Care of Children and Other De-
pendents, 11,010 P-H TAX IDEAS 11,231; 11,235-36 (1969).
57. See, e.g., COMPENDIUM 404; Pechman, Individual Income Tax Provisions of the
1954 Code, 8 NAr'L TAX J. 114 (1955).
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sixteen if the child was physically or mentally unable to attend a regular
school.5" The version of the bill which became law, however, allowed a
deduction both for care of a child under twelve59 and also for care of any
other person for whom the taxpayer could claim a dependency exemp-
tion under sections 151 (e) (1) and 152 of the Code, as long as that
person was unable to care for himself."0
Changing the age below which expenses could be claimed from ten
to twelve resulted from recognition by the Senate Finance Committee
that "the problems of providing adequate supervision for children while
the parent is employed include those for children up to 12 years of age
.... -1 An age limit was still retained, however, to limit the deduction
to "business-type" expenses. "Denial of the deduction to parents with
children who have gone beyond the sixth grade helps to avoid granting
allowances to working parents who hire maids or other servants primarily
to perform services other than to take care of the children."62 In addition,
the Senate committee recognized that "financial problems [similar to
those of working parents eligible for the deduction] may be incurred by
taxpayers who, if they are to be gainfully employed, must provide care
for physically or mentally incapacitated dependents other than their
children."6 " The deduction was expanded to include expenditures for
care of such dependents.
The terms of this limitation are reasonably successful when con-
sidered as an attempt to confine the deduction to "business-type" expen-
ditures. If the expenditure is for the care of a young child, the taxpayer
has a legal obligation to support and care for the child If the expenditure
is for care of another dependent, the expense is deductible only if that
person is unable to care for himself and if the taxpayer provides over
half of that person's support. In either case, therefore, the taxpayer is
responsible for providing care and must find a substitute to provide that
58. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 41, at 4055.
59. The age limit was raised to 13 by Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272,
§ 212, 78 Stat. 19, amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 214 (codified at INT. REV. CODE Of
1954, § 214(d) (1) (A)).
60. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 214(d).
61. 100 ConG. REC. 8995 (1954) (remarks of Senator Millikin, Chairman of Senate
Finance Comm., introducing the tax measure on Senate floor). For testimony sup-
porting the change see 1954 Hearings 807, 1798-99, 1993.
62. Pechman, Individual Income Tax Provisions of the 1954 Code, 8 NAT'L TAX J.
114, 121 (1955).
63. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 44, at 36. For test~mony supporting the change
see 1954 Hearings 276-77, 691, 1358, 1698-1700, 1798-99, 1913 (repeated at 2202-03),
2232-33.
64. Apparently these requirements also apply to a child of the taxpayer over 19
years of age under sections 151 (e) and 152.
19711
et al.: Sex and the Single Man: Discrimination in the Dependent Care Dedu
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
care in his stead if he is to be gainfully employed.
This limitation is probably not as successful in achieving its social
policy goals. The provision may have been intended to encourage employ-
ed low income parents to provide substitute care for their children.65 If
this is the case, the result is more form than substance because a taxpayer
must itemize his deductions before he can benefit from the provision. It
has been pointed out that many low income parents with dependent care
expenses must use the standard deduction either because of the difficulty
of itemizing expenses or because with little disposable income these
taxpayers make few expenditures which qualify for deductibility."
The Third Limitation: The Amount of the Deduction
The maximum amount deductible under the 1954 provision was
$600.7 This dollar limitation has been justified in "business expense"
terms:
The maximum limit of $600 is a rough method of differentiating
between the business-expense element of child-care expense
and the personal-expense element. Of necessity, such a limit
must be arbitrary, and it is better to set it at a relatively low
level to avoid the criticism that the deduction subsidizes luxury-
type personal expenditures. 8
The $600 limitation has been criticized for not promoting the
social policy goals of the deduction. As mentioned previously,69 possible
benefits under the provision may be unattainable by a taxpayer because
of the itemizing requirement. In addition, the limitation has been con-
sidered too small to have any real incentive effect or to serve as a hard-
ship subsidy for low income taxpayers."' It was pointed out during
congressional debate on the measure that the amount deductible is only
an average of $11.54 a week. Even in 1954, Congressmen wondered
who could find adequate child care for that amount." Furthermore,
because the provision operates to determine taxable income rather than
65. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
66. 100 CONG. REC. 9605 (1954) 1954 Hearings 807, 881, 1993. See also COMPEN-
DIUM 435-36, 439.
67. This limitation was increased to $900 if there are two or more dependents by
the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 212, 78 Stat. 19, amending INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 214 (codified at INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 214(b) (1) (B)).
68. Pechman, supra note 62.
69. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
70. H.R. REP. No. 1337 (Minority Views), supra note 41, at 4603; 100 CoN. Rac.
3451, 3456 (1954) ; 1954 Hearings, supra note 42, at 807, 1059-60, 1062, 1993.
71. 100 CONG. REc. 3451 (1954) ; 1954 Hearings 807.
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actual tax liability, the maximum amount of monetary benefit a tax-
payer could receive through the deduction is never as much as $600.
For a single head of household with total taxable income between
$4000 and $6000, the maximum reduction in actual tax liability under
the provision is only $120.72 The taxpayer must have spent at least $600
for dependent care in order to receive this maximum reduction. The
terms of this limitation also tend to provide a greater potential benefit
to higher income taxpayers than to very low income taxpayers. These
individuals must search for the least expensive care available, despite the
token offset against their expenses. If a low income taxpayer is fortunate,
an older child, a relative or a neighbor may be able to look after the
children without charge; in such a case, the taxpayer would receive no
benefit under section 214."' Finally, it should be pointed out that a
working parent's decision to obtain substitute care is probably dependent
upon the parent's recognition that good care is needed, the kinds of care
facilities available and the parent's ability to pay for the substitute care
he selects. It is doubtful that the existence of section 214 is a determina-
tive factor at all.
The Fourth Limitation: The Income Ceiling on Married Taxpayers
The original House proposal did not include a child care deduction
for wives with working husbands."' The scope of the provision was
expanded during Senate consideration of the measure to allow a depen-
dent care deduction to a working married woman but only if the woman
filed a joint return with her husband. The amount of the deduction
would be reduced dollar for dollar by the amount by which the couple's
adjusted gross income exceeded $4500. After their combined income
reached $5100, therefore, no dependent care expenses could be deducted."
It has been suggested that placing an income ceiling on married
taxpayers but not on widows, divorced persons or other single persons
72. Computed from INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1(b) (1) (B), rates of tax on heads
of households for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1964.
73. The counterargument has been made that tax provisions are not intended to
benefit those who cannot qualify for them and that it is absurd to criticize a tax provi-
sion for failing to benefit all needy citizens on the ground that needy citizens who don't
pay taxes don't receive benefits under tax provisions.
74. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 41, at 4055.
75. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 44, at 36. The income ceiling was raised to $6000
and husbands with incapacitated wives were included, with the income ceiling and joint
return requirements, by Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 212, 78 Stat. 19,
amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 214 (codified at INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 214(a),
(b), (c), (d) (4)).
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entitled to the deduction is relatively indefensible.7" The income ceiling
for married taxpayers can be defended, however, if considered as part
of the goal of confining the deduction to "business-type" expenditures.
A single person with dependents requiring both care and support is
faced with two mutually exclusive demands on his time and energy. He
cannot choose between spending his time providing support and spending
his time providing care; both must be done, and the nature of the
responsibilities requires that both must be done at the same time. There-
fore, for a single taxpayer, hiring a substitute to provide care is always
like a "business" expense incurred in order to obtain time and energy to
be gainfully employed."7 The particular level of income derived from
the employment is irrelevant to the question of his motivation for hiring
a substitute. For the employed couple with dependents, however, the
situation is different. Maintaining a certain income level is essential to
provide adequate support for a family. That income level was estimated
at $4500 in 1954, a figure which is necessarily arbitrary but arguably
reasonable." If one spouse alone can earn this amount, the decision of
the other spouse to be gainfully employed is a decision based much more
upon personal rather than economic factors. Therefore, according to this
analysis, dependent care expenses incurred to permit the second spouse
to be gainfully employed when the family income is above the income
ceiling level are much more like "personal" expenses than like "business"
expenses.7"
Though the terms of the provision permit this "business expense"
analysis to account for the income ceiling, the arguments given in
support of the limitation when the measure was under consideration
were based on administrative factors and social policy. According to
Undersecretary of the Treasury Marion B. Folsom, the administrative
reason for the limitation was that allowing working wives whose hus-
bands were also working to deduct dependent care expenses regardless
76. Pechman, Indizidual Income Tax Provisions of the 1954 Code, 8 NAT'L TAX J.
114, 121 (1955).
77. See p. 423 supra.
78. "In 1961, according to the Department of Labor Statistics, the median income
of husband-wife families in which the wife worked at any time during the year was
$7,050." S. REP No. 830. 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) in U.S. ConE CONG. & An. NEWS
1673, 1741 (1964). The Senate proposed increasing the income ceiling to $7000 in 1964;
the compromise version of the bill which was enacted into law provided for a $6000 in-
come ceiling. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
79. The "business-type" expense analysis breaks down when applied to the husband
with an incapacitated or institutionalized wife. See note 75 supra. Since his wife is un-
able to provide child care. there seems to be no material difference between his situation
and that of a widower or divorced man who is not restricted by the income ceiling.
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of family income would be too costly in terms of tax revenue loss." The
social policy argument was presented by Treasury Secretary George
Humphrey who testified that because of concern about rising juvenile
delinquency,"1 allowing working wives to deduct child care expenses had
been opposed in the House Ways and Means Committee because of
"great arguments that the mother ought to be at home looking after
her children where there is a wage earner in the family." 2 The Senate
Finance Committee, however, recognized that "in a large number of
families, both the husband and wife must be gainfully employed in order
to maintain an adequate living standard for their families" 8 and there-
fore provided a deduction when both spouses work because of economic
necessity."8
It should be emphasized that although the provision arose from
traditional concepts of sex roles-that men are breadwinners and women's
place is in the home-the provision in practice does not discriminate
against couples who do not choose a traditional arrangement of family
responsibilities. This is a result of the requirement that a working
married woman claiming the deduction file a joint return with her
husband if he is not disabled. The joint return was a necessary require-
ment to administer the income ceiling qualification. Because of the joint
return, the deduction, although strictly speaking available only to the
wife, is actually available to both husband and wife. The deduction
therefore could be claimed not only by the "traditional" family when the
wife becomes gainfully employed but also if the wife has been supporting
the family and then the husband, who had been caring for the children,
obtained employment. Therefore, regardless of family arrangements, the
deduction can be used by married couples subject only to the income
ceiling.
The Fifth Limitation: The Characteristics of Eligible Taxpayers
The original House proposal would have restricted use of the
deduction to widows, widowers, divorced persons and wives whose
husbands were incapacitated or institutionalized. 5 This original proposal
set the pattern for the final version; rather than describing those tax-
80. 1954 Hearings, supra note 42, at 117.
81. See, e.g., Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 89, Investigation of Juvenile Delin-
quency in the United States, Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1954).
82. 1954 Hearings, supra note 42, at 117.
83. 100 CONG. REC. 8995 (1954) (remarks of Senator Millikin).
84. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 44, at 36. For testimony in support of this change
see 1954 Hearings 807, 1057-63, 1798-99, 1993, 2365-66.
85. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 41, at 4055.
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payers who were excluded from the terms of the provision, the proposal
described the taxpayers who could use the deduction. The final version
of the limitation, however, had been expanded so much from the original
terms that only men who were neither widowed, divorced nor legally
separated were excluded. This expansion reflected arguments both of
minority members of the House Ways and Means Committee86 and of
many individuals whose testimony was considered during the Senate
Finance Committee hearings.8 7
Charles E. Moritz, a single never-married man, was one of the
individuals excluded by this limitation. Moritz claimed that he was
similarly situated to single women and widowers who could claim the
deduction. Because of this similarity, Moritz contended that the pro-
vision is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable in excluding him.88
If there is a reasonable basis for creating a distinction between
single never-married men and the taxpayers entitled to the deduction,
then Moritz's contention is invalid. Whether a reasonable basis exists,
however, will be determined by considering the relationship between a
taxpayer and a dependent for whom the taxpayer must provide care.
There are two categories of dependents for whose care expenditures are
deductible: young children and other individuals unable to care for
themselves.
A single never-married man acquires a child care responsibility
if he becomes an adoptive parent or if he assumes custody of his illegiti-
mate child.89 There is no difference between the relationship of the
taxpayer and child in these situations and that relationship when the
taxpayer is a single never-married woman or a widowed or divorced man.
In any case the taxpayer has a legal responsibility to provide both
support and care for the child; his expenditures for substitute care to
allow him to be employed are no less a "business-type" expense when he
is a single never-married man than in any other situation. Considering
social policy consequences, it seems absurd- to reward a single woman
who supports and provides care for an adopted or natural child but not
to encourage single never-married men to provide a home for a needy
child.9"
86. Id. at 4603.
87. 1954 Hearings 117, 276-77, 691, 807, 1057-63, 1238, 1358, 1698-1700, 1798-99, 1993,
2365-66.
88. 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970).
89. It should be noted that many states have laws requiring a man to provide fi-
nancial support for his illegitimate child, but this disctssion concerns acquiring a per-
sonal responsibility to provide care for a child in addition to support.
90. See COMPENDIUM 461.
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Charles E. Moritz's situation provides the most obvious example
of how a single never-married man might acquire a responsibility to
support and care for a dependent other than a child-the situation of the
aged parent who can no longer care for himself. The relationship between
an adult taxpayer and his parent, when the taxpayer is a single never-
married man, differs little from any other case. An adult child has no
common law duty to support or care for a parent. Any legal duty
adhering to the relationship between parent and child would arise from
a contract between them or from a state law such as those relating to
support of the indigent. 1 In the absence of a legal duty, the responsibility
of providing care and support is assumed through affection or a sense of
moral duty. Whether based upon law, morality or affection, however, the
responsibility is no different when the taxpayer is a single never-married
man from any other case. Again, as with children, there is no basis for
the distinction by means of a "business expense" argument. Similarly,
explanations in terms of social policy produce absurd results. Encouraging
single women and widowers to provide care for their disabled parents
but not encouraging single never-married men to do the same is without
justification.
It is submitted, therefore, that there is no justification in terms of
"business expense" or social policy for the provisions of the limitation
by which Moritz was excluded from the benefit of section 214. The Tax
Court stated in support of the terms of the limitation that "during the
Senate hearings on the 1954 Code, there was testimony on the issue of
allowing the deduction to all single individuals, but this was rejected as
is evident from the final form of the provision."92 Looking at the results
of the limitation and the manner in which the provision changed as
the tax bill wound its way through Congress, it is much more reasonable
to suggest that a deduction for single never-married men was not
specifically rejected, as the Tax Court claimed, but simply omitted by
oversight.9 It is true that suggestions were made during the Senate
hearings to extend the deduction to "all taxpayers" ' and single tax-
payers9" who otherwise qualified. The Senate committee was concerned,
however, that its benevolence in extending the provision not be too
costly in terms of lost tax revenue,9 and the term "all taxpayers" may
91. For an example of state law see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-18 (1963).
Colorado was Moritz's state of residence.
92. 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970).
93. COMPENDIUM 461.
94. 1954 Hearings 1798-99.
95. C. 1954 Hearings 277.
96. See note 80 supra and accompanying* text.
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have seemed unnecessarily broad. The plight of the working unwed
mother" and that of the single woman supporting an aged parent" were
specifically brought to the attention of the Senate committee, and (in a
way that has been called "the incorporation of a private bill in public
law") these particular hardship cases were given relief under the
provision."' The fact that there were many similarly situated taxpayers
excluded from relief by the terms of the provision might not have
been apparent in the short time Congress had to analyze the bill.' The
words of the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator
Millikin, as he introduced the tax bill on the floor of the Senate,
afford basis for the additional conjecture that he, at least, actually had
been left with the impression that any taxpayer supporting and caring
for a dependent other than a child was included in the provision. Senator
Millikin stated that "[r]elief is extended to a single taxpayer, who
in order to be employed, may have to provide care for a dependent,
other than a child, who is physically unable to care for himself."' 2 The
conjecture regarding this comment seems just as valid as the Tax
Court's statement in Moritz that "the final form of the provision" in-
dicated a specific intent to reject the proposal to allow all single tax-
payers to claim the deduction. That conclusion of the court, in view of
the legislative history of the provision, is less reasonable than the
suggestion made previously-that similarly situated taxpayers excluded
from the provision were omitted by oversight, the result of a desire
to maintain tax revenues coupled with the fact that no one noticed the
potential discrimination at the time. This discussion, though suggesting
how Congress even with the best of intentions might have enacted an
unreasonably discriminatory law, does not offer justification for re-
taining the existing terms of the provision." 3
97. 1954 Hearings 1062.
98. Id. at 276-77, 691, 1798-99.
99. 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY, supra note 11, at 259.
100. 100 CONG. Rac. D440 (Daily Digest 1954).
101. Cf. 100 CONG. REC. 9606 (1954) (motion of Senator Douglas to recommit the
tax bill for additional study and debate on motion). See also 100 CONG. R.c. 8993 (1954)
(remarks of Senator Millikin) :
There are some who urge that action on this bill should be delayed to permit
further study and analysis of its provisions as a safeguard against possible
errors. But . . . if any errors should develop, they can be corrected by sub-
sequent legislation.
Postponing action now . . . [would mean that] the widow and working wife
seeking relief this year for child-care expenses will not . . . [receive it].
Id.
102. 100 CONG. REc. 8995 (1954) (emphasis added). Cf. 100 CONG. REc. D440
(Daily Digest 1954) noting especially the wording of modification (2).
103. "Laws enacted with good intention, when put to the test, frequently, and to the
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ASSURING DUE PROCESS: THE JUDICIAL CONCERN
Though it can be concluded that the terms of the fifth limitation are
indeed unreasonable, the question raised before the Tax Court by Charles
E. Moritz cannot yet be answered. One must consider whether the
unreasonableness of the provision necessarily results in an unconstitu-
tional violation of Charles E. Moritz's right to due process under the
fifth amendment.
The Tax Court stated in Moritz:
We glean from petitioner's argument a constitutional objection
based, it seems, on the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. Petitioner claims discrimination in that he, a single male,
is not entitled to the same tax treatment under Section 214
as other single persons, widowers and single women, are
entitled.
The objection is not well taken. As stated previously,
deductions are within the grace of Congress. If Congress sees
fit to establish classes of persons who shall or shall not benefit
from a deduction, there is no offense to the Constitution, if
all members of one class are treated alike. Such classifications
have traditionally been held to be constitutional.'
Mertens points out that "[w]hat constitutes 'due process' [in the
context of federal income tax legislation] defies description."' ° To this
can be added the statement of the Supreme Court that "[e]xcept in
special and rare instances, the due process of law clause contained in the
Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred
upon Congress by the Constitution." '
The power of Congress to tax individual income under the sixteenth
amendment has been upheld since the Supreme Court's 1915 decision of
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad. 7 Some courts have suggested,
however, that certain kinds of deductions for business expenses may be
a matter of "fundamental right" because of a distinction between gross
receipts and the "income" which can be taxed.' Because the power to
surprise of the law maker himself, turn out to be mischievous, absurd or otherwise ob-
jectionable. But in such case the remedy lies with the lawmaking authority, and not
with the courts." Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
104. 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970).
105. 1 J. MaRTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 4.09 (1969).
106. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1933).
107. 240 U.S. 1 (1915).
108. Davis v. United States, 87 F2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 704
(1937).
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tax "income" is indisputable, any deductions for personal expenses have
been provided as a matter of legislative grace.'0 9 Mertens points out that
even if such a distinction is valid
[i]t is not always easy to determine whether the particular
item of expense is personal to the taxpayer or incurred in
connection with his business....
Expenses incurred in order to permit a taxpayer to carry
on a business are not deductible unless the expense may be
said to have been incurred in the carrying on of the business
itself."'
Moritz might have attempted to argue that his dependent care
expenses were like business expenses and should have been deductible
as a matter of "fundamental right." It is unlikely, however, that a court
would accept this argument. In Mildred A. O'Connor,"' a 1946 decision
rendered before the enactment of a dependent care deduction, the Tax
Court ruled that for a married couple, the cost of hiring a nursemaid to
care for their children while both parents were employed was not
deductible either as an ordinary and necessary business expense or as a
nonbusiness expense incurred in the production of income. When Con-
gress responded to the equity argument posed by O'Connor and similar
cases, "'2 instead of declaring that expenses for the care of children and
other dependents were "ordinary and necessary business expenses," de-
pendent care expenses were made the subject of a special deduction under
section 214. Therefore, a court might argue that Congress did not
actually classify such expenses as the kind which might be deductible as
a matter of "fundamental right" and did not choose to include Moritz
within the scope of its "grace."
The Brushaber decision" 3 not only declared a federal income tax
to be a constitutional exercise of Congress' power but also established
the right of Congress to create classifications for the purpose of taxing
income and to treat those classifications differently. The Supreme Court
said that such classifications would violate due process only if they were
"so wanting in basis for classification as to produce such a gross and
patent inequality' '111 that the statute resulted in confiscation rather than
taxation. The distinction between married and single taxpayers is one
109. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
110. 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.02 (1966).
111. 6 T.C. 323 1946).
112. See, e.g., Edward Hauser, 49 P-H Tax Ct. Mem 331 (1949).
113. 240 U.S. 1.
114. Id. at 25.
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classification which has withstood this test."' Moritz's claim of uncon-
stitutional discrimination was based as much upon the fact that he was
single as upon the fact that he was a man. Whether discrimination on
the basis of sex in a federal income tax statute violates fifth amendment
due process has never been determined by the Supreme Court." 6 The
"strong tendency on the part of the courts to sustain the constitutionality
of a tax '""" would have to be overcome, however, before Moritz's claim
would be considered on its merits. As Mr. Justice Douglas wrote in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp., 1 8 "[a]
claim of unreasonable classification or inequality in the incidence or
application of a tax raises no question under the Fifth Amendment,
which contains no equal protection clause.""
t9
If a court were to consider Charles E. Moritz's claim on its merits,
it would have to determine whether section 214 violates due process by
not allowing Moritz to deduct $600 from his total taxable income but
allowing the deduction to a woman or widower in Moritz's position.
As noted previously, 2 ' because Moritz was denied the deduction he
owed an additional $328.80 in federal income taxes for 1968.2' Despite
the fact that this result is clearly discriminatory, it is not intuitively
clear that the "gross and patent inequality" test 22 is satisfied, particularly
115. For a discussion of tax equity problems created by distinction between married
and single taxpayers see COMPENDIUM 473-86.
116. In American, Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900), the Court
stated that
if . . . discrimination [in a state tax statute] were purely arbitrary, oppressive
or capricious, and made to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, re-
ligiot opinions, political affiliations or other considerations having no possible
connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers, such exemption would be
pure favoritism, and a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less
favored classes.
But see note 119 infra and accompanying text.
117. 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 4.01 (1969).
118. 314 U.S. 463 (1941).
119. Id. at 468; cf. C.J. Tower & Sons v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 874, 879-80
(Cust. Ct. 1955):
Considering plaintiff's claim that the fifth amendment, forbidding the taking of
property without due process of law, is broad enough to cover all or nearly all
cases of unequal protection of the laws . . . [the tax at hand] applies equally to
all in each specified class. Therefore, it meets the test of constitutional equal
protection and is valid.
120. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
121. The amount of Moritz's tax deficiency because of denial of the deduction rep-
resents 54.8% of the added $600 increment to his taxable income. Using the rate table
cited at note 72, supra, Moritz's total taxable income must have been around $44,000 and
his total tax liability slightly more than $16,520. As a result of the discrimination,
therefore, Moritz is paying about 2% more in total taxes than he would if he were a
woman or a widowed or divorced man.
122. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
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since other clearly discriminatory tax provisions12 have passed con-
stitutional muster in the past. 2 '
The fact that discriminatory treatment may have been upheld in the
past, however, is not sufficient justification by itself for continued
judicial support of such discrimination. If a court faced with the Moritz
case were tempted to declare that section 214 was unconstitutional, how-
ever, there would still be a sound policy argument for the exercise of
judicial restraint. Such a decision would set a precedent for taxpayers
to appeal not only to Congress, as they do now, but also to the courts for
relief from what they consider discriminatory provisions.2 5 It is, of
course, true that one decision or even a series of decisions would not
prevent the courts from drawing a line and denying relief at any future
time. Nevertheless, declaring that even one special provision of the
Internal Revenue Code was discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional
would tend to decrease the flexibility Congress now has in attempting to
provide for tax equity.' Such a decision would give judicial support to
one approach to achieving tax equity-the present "special provisions"
system. This would be unfortunate. Congress should be encouraged to
search for creative solutions to the changing problems of tax equity.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Court was correct in stating that Moritz's relief should
be sought in Congress, not in the courts. The complexity of the problem
of the dependent care deduction illustrated in this discussion would seem
to prescribe that the appropriate legislative remedy should come through
tax law rather than by means of an equal rights amendment. Even
though traditional concepts of sex roles gave rise to the terms of portions
of section 214, it was pointed out that those terms in practice do not
result in discrimination on the basis of sex. 2" Although Charles E. Moritz
as a single never-married man is denied the deduction, the discrimina-
tion is not purely on the basis of sex, and other factors must be considered
123. See notes 115, 119 supra and accompanying text.
124. Among other problems, one cannot be sure that a rule of law issuing from a
case dealing with a tax provision which directly affects tax liability (such as the married-
single distinction in the Brushaber case) would apply to section 214. Moritz's additional
tax liability is only an indirect result of the operation of section 214 since the section acts
only as a part of the income definition process prior to application of the statutory tax
rate to determine tax liability. How much actual effect section 214 has on tax liability
depends upon factors other than the dependent care deduction: the level of an individual's
taxable income, which is affected as much by all other special. provisions as by section
214, and the actual rate of tax upon the particular level of income involved.
125. COMPENDIUM 251-60.
126. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
127. See p. 429 supra.
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to provide an equitable legislative solution.
There is substantial support for the opinion that section 214 should
be amended to provide a dependent care deduction for "all taxpayers"
who can qualify under the first four limitations discussed herein.' Others
have recommended even greater expansion. *2 9 Critics of .section 214 have
suggested that the provision be eliminated.' It is clear that no changes
should be made in the provision without careful consideration of their
effects on tax equity.'' For example, the suggestion has been made that
the income ceiling limitation be removed ... and that a working woman be
allowed an added deduction for expenses incurred for household
services. 8 These suggestions have been made to solve what some feel
to be a lack of tax equity resulting from an imputed income problem. 8'
A housewife who contemplates becoming gainfully employed realizes
that the net monetary gain to her faimly will not be the amount of her
paycheck. This is because "[s]ervices ordinarily performed by the
wife in the home are a significant element of the normal family's income
.. "185 When a woman chooses to work outside the home, she frequently
must employ household help in addition to providing substitute care for
her children. These expenses reduce her actual net income. The argu-
ment that these expenses should be deductible because of the imputed
income problem, however, does not answer the problem in terms of tax
equity. The difficulty arises because of a theoretical dispute among tax
analysts who cannot decide how imputed income should be valued. Some
say that "if a wife works there is no addition to the family's income,
since her household services and lesiure time are properly evaluated on
the basis of potential earnings. The appropriate adjustments, then, [to
achieve tax equity] is to impute to the income of nonworking wives
the value of their foregone earnings."'' Other tax analysts believe that
the imputed income of housewives should be given the value of household
services at the market cost of such services. Using this approach, an
equitable solution would result by permitting working wives to deduct
the cost of obtaining household help and dependent care from their
128. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
129. See 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY, supra note 11, at 363-64.
130. COMPENDIUM 435, 438.
131. Id. at 404.
132. Pechman, Individual Income Tax Proisions of the 1954 Code, 8 NAT'L TAX J.
114, 121 (1955).
133. 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY 363-64; COMPENDIUM 371-72.
134. 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY 363-64; COMPENDIUM 371-72.
135. 1955 FED. TAX POLICY STUDY 363.
136. Id. at n.13.
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earnings so that only their actual income gain would be taxed.""7 The
latter solution is what many now propose, since the first approach is
impracticable because it is virtually impossible to determine foregone
earnings accurately.18 It is submitted, however, that the second imputed
income valuation theory is invalid because the solution it offers does not
truly answer the equity problem. This can be shown most clearly in
regard to expenses incurred for household help.
All taxpayers require certain essential "household services :" those
related to being fed, clothed and sheltered. If an individual is gainfully
employed, he can choose to perform those services for himself after
work, saving money but losing leisure time, or he can choose to pay
others to perform the services for him, losing money and gaining
leisure. It is obvious that the lower the income of the individual, the
more likely he is to perform necessary services for himself after work
rather than spending money to have them done by others. It would be
absurd, in the name of "tax equity," to provide a deduction to a taxpayer
who earned enough to afford to have others work for him so that he
could have leisure time after work, when a taxpayer with less income
was giving up that leisure time and was not entitled to a tax benefit.
It has been said that "[i]solated statements regarding the wisdom
of a proposed amendment to any given section of the code cannot be
made. The entire tax base must be viewed as a single entity before an
enlightened opinion can be expressed on any given provision."' 89 This
analysis of section 214 is supportive of that proposition. Thoughtful
consideration is mandatory before adoption of any deceptively simple
solution to a tax problem such as that posed by Charles E. Moritz.
137. B. BiTTKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 53-54 (3d ed.
1964) quoting VICEREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 44-47 (1958) ; COMPENDIUM
371-72.
138. BITrKER, supra note 137, at 53-54.
139. COMPENDIUM 435.
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